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Abstract—The connectivity structure of a network can be very
sensitive to removal of certain nodes in the network. In this paper,
we study the sensitivity of the largest component size to node
removals. We prove that minimizing the largest component size
is equivalent to solving a matrix one-norm minimization problem
whose column vectors are orthogonal and sparse and they form a
basis of the null space of the associated graph Laplacian matrix.
A greedy node removal algorithm is then proposed based on the
matrix one-norm minimization. In comparison with other node
centralities such as node degree and betweenness, experimental
results on US power grid dataset validate the effectiveness of
the proposed approach in terms of reduction of the largest
component size with relatively few node removals.
Index Terms—graph Laplacian, greedy node removal, network
robustness, spectral graph theory, topological vulnerability
I. INTRODUCTION
Networks are vulnerable to selective node removals and
even a few such removals can severely disrupt their operation
[1]. The sensitivity of the size of the largest component to node
removals is one of the most important topological vulnerability
measures in network science [2], as it is closed related to
the functionality, robustness and fragility [3]–[6]. Despite its
wide range of interest, little is known on how one might most
efficiently disrupt a network given a fixed number of node
removals and how to identify the most vulnerable nodes.
A phase transition occurs when the fraction of removed
nodes exceeds certain critical value, and the largest component
vanishes into several small components. Under uncorrelated
random graph assumptions, Cohen et. al. [7] use degree dis-
tributions to evaluate the critical value for this phase transition
based on node degree removals. However, it has been shown
in [8], [9] that the uncorrelated graph assumption is a poor fit
to some real world networks.
Another commonly adopted node centrality for studying
network connectivity is betweenness centrality [10]. The be-
tweenness of a node v is defined as
σ(v) =
∑
s6=v 6=t
σst(v)
σst
, (1)
where σst is the total number of shortest paths from node
s to node t and σst(v) is the number of those paths that
pass through v. Roughly speaking, a node is regarded as
more important if it is bypassed by more shortest paths in
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the network. Holme et. al. [11] have shown that greedy node
removals can be made more harmful by iteratively removing
the node with the highest node degree. They also empirically
verify that betweenness based node removal is more effective
than degree based node removal in terms of minimizing
largest component size. In this paper, we propose a new
network robustness measure that is directly related to the
largest component size. When used to minimize the largest
component size, our proposed measure outperforms the degree
and betweenness centrality.
The proposed measure is based on the graph Laplacians
[12]. The graph Laplacian has been widely used to characterize
graph connectivity. We establish a link between the graph
Laplacian and the size of the largest component. Specifically,
we show that minimizing largest component size is equivalent
to finding a set of sparse orthogonal vectors that span the
null space of the associated graph Laplacian matrix. The
equivalence is exact and it imposes no restrictive assumptions,
e.g. uncorrelatedness, small world network structure, scale-free
degree distribution, etc. Based on the formulation, a spectral
graph cut based greedy node removal procedure is proposed
to identify the most vulnerable nodes.
To illustrate our proposed method, we use United States
power grid topology. Comparing with strategies based on node
degree and betweenness, our proposed graph Laplacian node
removal approach leads to a selection of nodes whose removal
significantly increases the rate of reduction of the largest
component size. This results in a useful measure of network
sensitivity that can be used to asses network vulnerability to
node removals.
II. PROPERTIES OF GRAPH LAPLACIANS
Consider an unweighted and undirected network containing
no self loops or multiple edges, the corresponding network
graph can be denoted by a simple graph G = (V,E) with node
set V and edge set E = {(u, v) : u, v ∈ V }, where |V | = n
and |E| = m are the number of nodes and edges in the graph,
respectively. The adjacency matrix A of G is a binary symmet-
ric n-by-n matrix, where Aij = 1 if (i, j) ∈ E and otherwise
Aij = 0. Let di denote the number of edges incident to node
i, the degree matrix D = diag(d1, d2, . . . , dn) is a diagonal
matrix with its entry Dii = di. The graph Laplacian matrix L
of G is defined as L = D−A, and L can be decomposed by the
outer product of an n-by-m signed incidence matrix B such
that L = BBT . For any e = (v, w) ∈ E, v < w, Bv,e = 1 and
Bw,e = −1, otherwise Bv,e = 0. Therefore, L is a symmetric
and positive semidefinite (PSD) matrix. Similarly, the signless
graph Laplacian matrix Q is defined as Q = D + A [13],
where Q is PSD, symmetric and its incidence matrix is the
signless incidence matrix of G.
Let λi(L) be the i-th largest eigenvalue of L and 1 denote
the all one vector. Since L1 = (D − A)1 = 0, 1 is always in
the null space of L and the smallest eigenvalue λn(L) = 0.
Furthermore, the multiplicity of zero eigenvalues is equal to
the number of components (including the isolated nodes) of
a simple graph [14]. The nuclear norm of L is associated
with the number of edges in G as ‖L‖∗ =
∑n
i=1 λi(L) =
2|E|. Therefore, the highest-degree-first node removal strategy
is in fact a greedy nuclear norm minimization heuristic. The
aforementioned properties of graph Laplacians will be useful
in analyzing the network robustness to node removals.
III. NETWORK ROBUSTNESS MEASURE FORMULATION
Let R ⊂ V denote the set of removed nodes from G with
|R| = q and GR = (VR, ER) denote the remaining graph after
removing the nodes in R from G. When a node is removed,
the edges attached to the node will be removed as well. The
network vulnerability to node removals is evaluated in terms
of the remaining largest component size after node removals,
where we denote the size and the number of edges of the
largest component of GR by |V LCR | and |ELCR |, respectively. In
general, the optimal node removal set R that minimizes |V LCR |
is not unique. Therefore, we propose a node removal approach
that minimizes |V LCR | and |ELCR | simultaneously. Specifically,
we seek an R = R∗ that achieves
R∗ = min
R∈Fq
|ELCR |, (2)
where Fq = {R : R = argminR′, |R′|=q |V LCR′ |} is the
solution space containing the feasible node removal sets that
minimize the largest component size. In general, the computa-
tional complexity for solving this problem is of combinatorial
order
(
n
q
)
. We use graph Laplacians to formulate the network
metrics |V LCR | and |ELCR | and propose a greedy node removal
approach to reduce computational complexity.
A. Upper bound on the number of edges in the largest
component
For a given set of removed nodes R, let LR denote the
graph Laplacian matrix of GR and λi(LR) denote the i-th
largest eigenvalue of LR. The following theorem gives an
upper bound on the number of edges |ELCR | in the largest
component.
Theorem 1. |ELCR | is upper bounded by 18 (n + 1)λ1(Q˜R),
where Q˜R =
[
QR d
dT 0
]
, d = AR1 and QR = DR + AR is the
signless graph Laplacian matrix of GR.
Proof: Let AR be the adjacency matrix of GR and s be
an n × 1 identification vector such that si = 1 if i ∈ V LCR ,
otherwise si = −1. We have
|ELCR | =
1
2
∑
i,j∈V LC
R
[AR]ij =
1
8
∑
i,j
[AR]ij(1 + si)(1 + sj)
=
1
8
∑
i,j
[AR]ij +
1
4
∑
i,j
[AR]ijsi +
1
8
∑
i,j
[AR]ijsisj
=
1
8
∑
i
dis
2
i +
1
4
∑
i
disi +
1
8
∑
i,j
[AR]ijsisj
=
1
8
[
sT (DR +AR)s+ 2d
T s
]
=
1
8
[
sTQRs+ 2d
T s
]
=
1
8
s′T Q˜Rs′ ≤ 1
8
(n+ 1)λ1(Q˜R) (3)
by the Rayleigh quotient theorem [15], where s′ = [s 1]T .
The upper bound is attained if s′/
√
n+ 1 is an eigenvector of
λ1(Q˜R).
B. Largest component size
Let null(L) denote the null space of L and define the
sparsity of a vector to be the number of zero entries in the
vector. Next we express the largest component size via graph
Laplacians.
Theorem 2. |V LCR | = ‖X‖1 = maxi ‖xi‖1, where xi is the
i-th column vector of binary matrix X . The columns of X
are orthogonal and they form the sparsest basis of null(LR)
among binary vectors.
Proof: Let r be the rank of LR. We will prove that there
exists an n × (n − r) binary matrix X = [x1 x2 . . . xn−r]
whose columns {xi}n−ri=1 satisfy: 1) ‖xi‖1 is the size of the
i-th component of GR; 2) they are orthogonal. Assume GR
consists of K components. There exits a matrix permutation
(relabeling) such that
LR =

L1R 0 0 0
0 L2R 0 0
0 0
.
.
. 0
0 0 0 LKR
 . (4)
Associated with the i-th block matrix LiR we define xi as
an n × 1 binary vector xi in null(LR) having the form
xi = [0 . . . 0 1 . . . 1 0 . . . 0]
T
, where the locations of the
nonzero entries correspond to the indexes of the i-th block
matrix. It is obvious that ‖xi‖1 =
∑n
j=1 |xij | equals the
size of the i-th component and the {xi}n−ri=1 are mutually
orthogonal. Furthermore, there exists no other binary matrix
which is sparser than X with column span equal to null(LR).
If there existed another binary matrix that were sparser than X ,
then it contradicts the fact the its column vectors characterize
the component sizes of GR. Therefore the largest component
size of GR is |V LCR | = ‖X‖1 = maxi ‖xi‖1.
C. Greedy basis search algorithm for constructing X
It has been proven in Theorem 2.1 of [16] that a matrix X
is a sparsest basis for a finite dimensional linear subspace if
and only if it can be constructed by greedy basis search. This
result will allow us to solve for the solution X in Theorem
2 of Sec. III-B in polynomial time via Algorithm 1 due to
sparsity and mutual orthogonality of columns in X .
Note that singular value decomposition (SVD) or QR de-
composition methods can be used to find a matrix Y whose
Algorithm 1 Sparsest basis search algorithm for null(LR)
1: Obtain a linearly independent basis Y for null(LR).
2: Compute the number of nonzero and distinct nonzero
entries for each column vector yi in Y .
3: Select the sparsest column vector of Y . If there are more
than one such vectors then choose the vector with the most
distinct entries.
4: Decompose the chosen vector according to its nonzero
distinct entries. For each distinct entry, let e be the binary
vector such that its nonzero element is at the same location
as the chosen entry. If e is orthogonal to the column
vectors in X , then add e to X .
5: Repeat step 3) and 4) until rank(X) = rank(Y ).
column vectors are a basis of null(LR). Since each column
vector of y can be represented as the linear combination of
the column vectors of X and there is exactly one nonzero
entry in each row of X , the number of distinct entries of yi
is the number of active column vectors in X that contribute
to yi. In addition, due to sparsity and mutual orthogonality of
columns in X , the greedy basis search can be employed by
selecting the sparsest column vector from Y and decompose
the vector into several binary vectors and verify the mutual
orthogonality property. The criterion in [16] guarantees that
this basis search approach terminates in a finite number of
steps since the {xi}n−ri=1 are of finite dimension and the result
leads to the matrix X in Theorem 2.
For illustration, consider a network with four nodes, where
there is only one edge between node 1 and node 2. The
graph Laplacian matrix is L =
[
1 −1 0 0
−1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
]
. The matrix of
our interest is X =
[
1 0 0
1 0 0
0 1 0
0 0 1
]
, and the matrix we obtain from
SVD is Y =
[
0.5 0.5 0
0.5 0.5 0
0.5 −0.5 1/√2
0.5 −0.5 −1/√2
]
. Following the aforementioned
procedures for reconstructing X from Y , the number of
nonzero entries for yi is 4, 4 and 2, and the number of
distinct nonzero entries is 1, 2 and 2, respectively. Therefore
we start from y3 and decompose it into two vectors [0 0 1 0]T
and [0 0 0 1]T . We add these two vectors to X since they
are orthogonal to each other. Then we decompose y2 into
[0 0 1 1]T and [1 1 0 0]T . Since [0 0 1 1]T is not orthogonal
to the vectors in X , we discard this vector. Finally, the vector
[1 1 0 0]T is added into X by ckecking the orthogonality
property and we obtain the matrix X of interest.
To sum up, with the aid of Theorem 1 and Theorem 2, the
node removal problem in (2) can be reformulated as
R∗ = min
R∈Fq
λ1(Q˜R), (5)
where
Fq = {X : LRX = 0, |R| = q, X = argmin
X′
‖X ′‖1}. (6)
In other words, finding the most disruptive node removal set
when removing q nodes from the network is equivalent to
solving the minimum matrix one-norm problem on X and
then minimizing the largest eigenvalue of Q˜R.
IV. GREEDY NODE REMOVAL ALGORITHM
It remains to specify a node removal strategy that achieves
the minimum in (5). We propose a node removal strategy to
reduce computational complexity, i.e., a greedy node removal
algorithm based on spectral graph cut to successively remove
the most vulnerable single node. In other words, we recursively
solve the q = 1 version of (5) until the desired number of
nodes have been removed.
Algorithm 2 Greedy node removal based on spectral cut
1: Input: G and |R| = q
2: Output: R
3: R = ∅
4: for i = 1 to q do
5: Compute ŝ and V cut in the largest component.
6: Solve Fq = {v∗ : v∗ = argv∈V cut ‖X‖1}
7: if (|Fq| = 1) then
8: Set R = R ∪ v∗
9: else
10: u∗ = argminu∈Fq λ1(Q˜R)
11: Set R = R ∪ u∗
12: end if
13: end for
The spectral cut is associated with the second smallest
eigenvector of L (also known as the Fiedler vector [14]). For
a connected network G, let s be the identification vector such
that si = 1 if i-th node is in group 1 and si = −1 if i-th node
is in group 2. The cut size is the number of edges between
these two groups, where
cut size = 1
4
∑
i,j
Aij(1− sisj) = 1
4
sTLs. (7)
By relaxing s to be real valued and using the fact that
L1 = 0, the graph partition problem is equivalent to finding
an eigenvector of L that is orthogonal to 1 such that sTLs is
minimized [17]. This is an easily computable approximation
to the NP-hard graph partitioning problem. We have
s∗ = argmin
s⊥1
sTLs, (8)
where s∗ is an eigenvector of the second smallest eigenvalue of
L. The partitioning vector is ŝ = sgn(s∗), where sgn(si) = 1
if si > 0 and otherwise sgn(si) = −1. Define the spectral cut
as the set {(i, j) ∈ E : ŝiŝj = −1, Aij = 1}, and denote
V cut the set of nodes incident to the spectral cut, to be the set
of candidate nodes for removal. The optimization in (5), with
q = 1, is then restricted to the set of nodes in V cut, which is a
much smaller set than the entire set V of nodes in the graph.
This spectral cut and minimization of (5) process is repeated
q times resulting in a significant reduction in computational
complexity. Algorithm 2 summarizes the greedy node removal
procedure.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
An empirical dataset collected from the western states’
power subgrid in the United States [18] is used to evaluate
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Fig. 1. Performance evaluation of greedy node removals based on different
node centralities in western states power grid of the United States. This
network contains 4941 nodes and 6594 edges. The proposed greedy spectral
cut method better reduces the largest component size in the network than do
methods based on minimizing degree or betweenness centrality.
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Fig. 2. The number of candidate nodes for removal V cut determined by our
greedy spectral cut method. In the first five iterations of our greedy algorithm,
the average cardinality of V cut is less than 1% of the total number of nodes
(4941) in the network. This proportion decreases to less than 5% of the nodes
as q increases.
the proposed greedy spectral method of node removal. In this
network, the nodes represent power stations and the edges
represent transmission lines or transformers. The spectral cut
based greedy algorithm is compared with node degree and
betweenness based greedy node removals proposed in [11].
Fig. 1 displays the node removal performances in US power
grid, and it is quite surprising that the largest component size
drastically reduces to half of its original size by simply remov-
ing 10 nodes from the network using the proposed spectral cut
method, whereas we need to remove 30 nodes to achieve the
same performance if one uses betweenness measure. Degree
based node removal is not effective in reducing the largest
component size, which suggests that although removing nodes
with the highest degree seems to be quite intuitive, the high-
degree nodes do not necessarily play a key role in topological
vulnerability.
In addition, despite the fact that betweenness is a widely
adopted measure for evaluating node centrality, it can not fully
identify the most vulnerable nodes whose removal maximally
reduces the largest component size. The number of candidate
nodes for removal in each iteration are depicted in Fig. 2.
Observe that the number of candidate removal nodes is much
smaller than the network size, which makes the proposed
greedy node removal strategy effective for large-scale net-
works and facilitates the assessment of network vulnerability.
VI. CONCLUSION
Using spectral theory and graph Laplacians, we derive an
upper bound on the number of edges in the largest component
and we prove that the largest component size minimization
problem is equivalent to finding a set of the sparsest or-
thogonal basis for the null space of the associated graph
Laplacian matrix. This basis can be easily constructed using a
greedy basis search algorithm with polynomial computational
complexity. Experiments on the US power grid dataset show
that the proposed greedy node removal algorithm outperforms
other approaches based on node degree and betweenness. Our
proposed procedure is scalable to large networks and can
be used to reveal the vulnerability of modern networks. The
method can naturally be applied to exploring the vulnerability
of other networks such as biological networks, social networks,
and communication networks.
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